5. Use of Force to Protect
Other People
Justice asks the question of whether the current law that
restricts the defence of others to those under ones
protection, s. 37, ought to be expanded to include persons beyond the
narrow category of those who one is legally obliged to protect, such as
ones children and spouse.
CAEFS supports the view that we ought to expand the defence
beyond killing to protect third persons under ones
protection. It is clear that the current wording of s. 37 may prevent
successful reliance on self-defence for women whose relatives, friends, or
neighbours were threatened by the deceased, as a way to control or threaten the
accused. We also want to ensure that those brave people who intervene to
protect total strangers are not denied a defence. While CAEFS recognizes that
s. 27 of the Criminal Code, discussed below, should immunize this
action, we would argue that it is too broad in permitting violent defence of
property, excepting Aboriginal peoples in the circumstances described below,
under Defence of Property. CAEFS thus supports Judge Ratushnys
recommendation that citizens be lawfully able to use force to defend any other
person.
| Recommendation
#15: |
Draft a defence that is
open-ended in terms of protection of other persons, regardless of the legal
relationship between the accused and the person protected. |
6. Judging the
Circumstances; Judging the Force
Justice asks the question of whether the current way in which we
assess the appropriate circumstances for the use of self-defensive violence in
s. 34 ought to be retained. The current test asks both whether the accused
person actually believed that force was needed and whether that belief was also
objectively reasonable. Justice asks whether we should instead
adopt a purely subjective test and abandon the restriction that is imposed
through the objective, reasonableness requirement.
Justice also asks whether we should retain this same test for
the assessment of the degree of force that the accused used in self-defence.
The current law under s. 34 (2) requires that the accused both actually and
reasonably believe that the degree of force used was necessary to avert the
anticipated harm. Again Justice suggests the possibility of reverting to a
purely subjective test with respect to the assessment of the degree of force
used by the defender.
CAEFS supports the retention of a mixed subjective-objective
test for both the danger faced by the accused or another and the need to use
the degree of violence actually employed by the accused. This standard mirrors
the test used by the current law and by the Self-Defence Review: did the
accused actually and reasonably believe that the danger existed and did she
actually and reasonably believe that she needed to use the force used to
prevent it?
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